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Abstract
Local robustness ensures that a model classifies all
inputs within an -ball consistently, which precludes
various forms of adversarial inputs. In this paper, we
present a fast procedure for checking local robust-
ness in feed-forward neural networks with piecewise
linear activation functions. The key insight is
that such networks partition the input space into a
polyhedral complex such that the network is linear
inside each polyhedral region; hence, a systematic
search for decision boundaries within the regions
around a given input is sufficient for assessing
robustness. Crucially, we show how these regions
can be analyzed using geometric projections instead
of expensive constraint solving, thus admitting an
efficient, highly-parallel GPU implementation at the
price of incompleteness, which can be addressed by
falling back on prior approaches. Empirically, we
find that incompleteness is not often an issue, and
that our method performs one to two orders of mag-
nitude faster than existing robustness-certification
techniques based on constraint solving.
1. Introduction
We consider the problem of verifying the local robustness
of piecewise-linear neural networks for a given `p bound.
Precisely, given a point, x, network, F , and norm bound, , this
entails determining whether Equation 1 holds.
∀x′.‖x−x′‖p≤=⇒F(x)=F(x′) (1)
This problem carries practical significance, as such networks
have been extensively shown to be vulnerable to adversarial
examples (Szegedy et al., 2014; Papernot et al., 2016), wherein
small-norm perturbations are chosen to cause arbitrary
misclassifications.
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Numerous solutions have been proposed to address variants
of this problem. These can be roughly categorized into three
groups: learning rules that aim for robustness on known
training data (Madry et al., 2018; Wong & Kolter, 2018;
Croce et al., 2019), post-processing methods that provide
stochastic guarantees at inference time (Lecuyer et al., 2018;
Cohen et al., 2019), and verification routines that attempt
to answer Equation 1 (or a close analog of it) exactly (Katz
et al., 2017; 2019; Jordan et al., 2019; Tjeng & Tedrake, 2017;
Fischetti & Jo, 2018; Cheng et al., 2017) or via conservative
over-approximation (Weng et al., 2018; Singh et al., 2019b;
Balunovic et al., 2019; Ehlers, 2017; Wang et al., 2018;
Dutta et al., 2018; Gowal et al., 2018). While approximate
verification methods have shown promise in scaling to larger
networks, they may introduce an additional penalty to robust
accuracy by flagging non-adversarial points, thus limiting their
application in practice. Exact methods impose no such penalty,
but as they rely on expensive constraint-solving techniques,
they often do not scale to even moderately-sized networks.
In this paper, we present a verification technique for Equation 1
that neither relies on expensive constraint solving nor
conservative over-approximation. We build on the observation
that in Euclidean space, the angle between two random vectors
of equal norm is with high probability pi/2±O(1/√m) (Blum
et al., 2020, Chapter 2). In other words, random vectors in
high dimension are likely to be almost orthogonal, so the
distance from a point to a hyperplane segment can often
be approximated well by the distance from the point to its
projection onto the corresponding hyperplane.
Our algorithm (Section 2) leverages this insight to exhaustively
search the model’s decision boundaries around a point using
only geometric projections. The performance benefits of this
approach are substantial, especially in the case of `2 robust-
ness, where constraint solving is particularly expensive while
Euclidean projections can be efficiently computed using the dot
product and accelerated on GPU hardware; however, our algo-
rithm is also applicable to other norms, particularly those that ad-
mit efficient projection computation, including `∞ (Section 4.4).
Our algorithm is embarassingly parallel, and straightforward to
implement with facilities for batching that are available in many
popular libraries (Section 3). Additionally, we show how the
algorithm can be easily modified to find certified lower bounds
for , rather than verifying a given fixed value (Section 2.3).
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Because our algorithm relies exclusively on local projections, it
may encounter scenarios in which there is evidence to suggest
non-robust behavior, but the network’s exact boundaries cannot
be conclusively determined without accounting for global
constraints (Section 2, Figure 1). In such cases, the algorithm
must either return unknown, or fall back on constraint solving.
However, we prove that if the algorithm terminates with a
robust decision, then the model satisfies Equation 1, and
likewise if it returns not robust, then an adversarial example
exists (Section 2.2). Note that unlike prior work on approximate
verification, our approach can often separate not robust cases
from unknown, providing a concrete adversarial example in
the former. In this sense, the algorithm can be characterized
as sound but incomplete.
Our empirical evaluation (Section 4) demonstrates that for
several models trained on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, the
algorithm returns unknown only a small fraction of the time on
randomly-chosen test instances. Moreover, we show that our
implementation outperforms existing exact techniques (Jordan
et al., 2019; Tjeng & Tedrake, 2017; Katz et al., 2019) by
up to two orders of magnitude (Section 4.1, Tables 1 & 2),
while rarely being inconclusive on instances for which other
techniques do not time out. Additionally, we show that while
our implementation is not as fast as previous work on efficient
lower-bound computation for large models (Weng et al.,
2018), our certified lower bounds are consistently tighter, and
in some cases minimal (Section 4.2, Table 3). Finally, we
find that on models that have been regularized for efficient
verification (Croce et al., 2019), our technique performs even
faster, and scales to far larger models than could be verified
using similar techniques (Section 4.3, Table 4).
2. Algorithm
In this section we give a high-level overview of our proposed
algorithm (Section 2.1), and argue for its correctness (Sec-
tion 2.2). We also propose a variant (Section 2.3) to compute
certified lower bounds on the minimal adversarial distortion.
We note that both the algorithm and the correctness argument
are general and apply to arbitrary `p norms, and so for the
remainder of this section we use the un-subscripted notation ‖·‖
to refer to a general `p norm. However, in our implementation
(Section 3), we focus on local robustness for the `2 norm. We
do this for the following two reasons: (1) the algorithm relies
on projections that can be computed efficiently in Euclidean
spaces, and (2) there are few existing tools that can efficiently
guarantee local robustness with respect to `2, as they are usually
limited to processing linear computations (see Section 5).
2.1. The Algorithm
The algorithm we propose (Algorithm 1) takes a model, F , an
input, x, and a bound, , and either proves that Equation 1 is
satisfied (i.e., -local robustness), finds an adversarial input at
distance less than  from x, or returns unknown. Our algorithm
assumes F(x) = argmax{f(x)}, where f :Rm→Rn is the
function computed by a neural network composed of linear
transformations with ReLU activations.
The algorithm relies on the analysis of all possible activation
regions around x. An activation region is a maximal set of
inputs such that all elements have the same activation pattern.
Formally, let fu(x) denote the pre-activation value of neuron
u in network F when evaluating x. We say that neuron u is
activated if fu(x)≥0. An activation pattern,A, is a Boolean
function over neurons that characterizes whether each neuron
is activated. Then the activation region, A¯, associated with
patternA is the set of inputs that realizeA:
A¯ :={x |∀u.(fu(x)≥0)⇐⇒A(u)} (2)
Because we assume that F is a piecewise-linear composition
of linear transformations and ReLU activations, we can
associate the activation status A(u) of any neuron with a
closed half-space of Rm (Jordan et al., 2019). The activation
constraint, Cu, for neuron u and pattern A is the linear
inequality wTux+bu≤0, where wu and bu satisfy Equation 3.
∀x∈Rm.wTux+b≤0⇐⇒A(u) (3)
The intersection of these constraints yields the activation
region A¯, and the facets of A¯ correspond to the non-redundant
constraints. The convexity of activation regions follows from
this observation, as does the fact that the decision boundaries
are also linear constraints of the form f(x)i≥f(x)j for classes
i and j. More details on computing these constraints are given
in Section 3.1.
Algorithm 1 performs a search of all activation regions that
might be at distance less than  from x. Starting from the
region associated with the activation pattern of the input, x,
we collect all decision boundaries and activation constraints,
and enqueue those at distance less than  from x. Here
we define the distance, d, from x to a constraint, C, as
d(x, C) := minx′:C(x′) ‖x−x′‖. We then analyze each
constraint in the queue until the queue is empty.
If an analyzed constraint, C, is a decision boundary, we take
the projection, p, from x onto this constraint. Intuitively,
the projection, p, is an input satisfying C that is at minimal
distance from x, i.e., ∀x′.C(x′) =⇒‖x−p‖ ≤ ‖x−x′‖. If
p does not have the same class as x according to F (or lies
directly on the decision boundary between classes), then p
is an adversarial example. If p has the same class as x, it
means that the projection to the decision boundary is outside
of the activation region we are currently analyzing; however,
this is not sufficient to conclude that no point on the decision
boundary is inside both the current activation region and the
-ball (see Figure 1). Therefore, we return unknown.
On the other hand, if an analyzed constraint,Cu, is an activation
constraint, it means that the neighboring activation region with
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Algorithm 1 Checking Local Robustness
Input: model F , data x, bound 
Initialize queue=∅, visited=∅
pattern = activation pattern(x)
constrs =
[
get decision boundaries(F,pattern),
get activation constrs(F,pattern)
]
constrs = filter(queue, d(x,C)≤)
enqueue(queue, constrs)
visited += pattern
while queue 6=∅ do
C = dequeue(queue)
if is decision boundary(C) then
p = projection(x,C)
if F(x) 6=F(p) then
return not robust
else
return unknown
else
pattern = pattern associated with(C)
if pattern∈visited then
continue
else
constrs =
[
get decision boundaries(F,pattern),
get activation constrs(F,pattern)
]
constrs = filter(constrs, d(x,C′)≤)
enqueue(queue,constrs)
visited += pattern
return robust
p
x x
p
x
p
Figure 1. Three example cases showing a boundary constraint (red),
an activation constraint (gray), and the corresponding activation
region, A¯ (shaded area). The -ball surrounding x is denoted with the
dotted circle. In the case on the left, local robustness is not satisfied in
A¯, and p∈A¯, so we can return not robust. In the center case, local
robustness is not satisfied in A¯, but p /∈ A¯ so we cannot distinguish
this case from the case on the right, in which local robustness is
satisfied in A¯, using only projections. Thus, in both the center and
right cases we must return unknown.
neuron u flipped may intersect with the -ball centered at x.
This means that, if we are currently searching in activation
region, A¯, given by activation pattern A, then we must
search the region, A¯′u, given by activation pattern A
′
u, where
A(u′)=A′u(u
′) except when u=u′; in other words, we search
the region corresponding to the activation pattern that would be
obtained by flipping the neuron corresponding to the constraint
we are analyzing. As previously, we search A¯′u by gathering all
activation constraints and decision boundaries corresponding
toA′u, enqueuing the ones at distance less than  from x.
Exhausting the queue means that we did not find any
adversarial examples in any activation region that might
intersect with the -ball centered at x. We therefore conclude
that x is -robust in this case.
Note that since there are finitely many activation regions and
we only explore each region at most once, this algorithm
terminates.
Considering Additional Constraints It is common in
practice to include domain-specific constraints on which inputs
are considered valid adversarial examples. E.g., in the image
domain, adversarial examples are typically subject to box
constraints requiring each pixel to be in the range [0,1]. These
constraints can easily be incorporated into Algorithm 1 by
checking them at the same time we check ifF(x) 6=F(p)when
a decision boundary is found. If p is not a valid adversarial
example, Algorithm 1 would return unknown.
2.2. Correctness
In this section, we argue for the correctness of the proposed
algorithm. We show that when Algorithm 1 returns not robust,
there exists an adversarial example, and when it returns robust,
the model is locally robust at x, with radius . However, the
algorithm may also return unknown, in which case we do not
claim anything about the robustness of the model.
Theorem 1. (1) When Algorithm 1 returns not robust, there
exists an adversarial example, p, such that ‖x−p‖ ≤  and
F(x) 6=F(p). (2) When Algorithm 1 returns robust, for all x′
such that ‖x−x′‖≤, F(x)=F(x′).
Proof. In the first case, where Algorithm 1 returns not robust,
the proof of Theorem 1 is trivial: we exhibit a point, p, such
that ‖x−p‖≤, and for which F(x) 6=F(p).
The interesting case is when Algorithm 1 returns robust. We
prove by contradiction that in this case, x is in fact locally
robust with radius .
Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that Algorithm 1
returns robust, but there exists a point, p, such that ‖x−p‖≤
and F(x) 6= F(p). Let A¯x and A¯p be the activation regions
associated with x and p respectively.
We define a path of activation regions as a sequence, A¯0,...,A¯k,
of activation regions such that the underlying activation pat-
terns Ai and Ai+1 differ in exactly one neuron for all i, and
there exists at least one input, xi, that has activation pattern
Ai for all i. For instance, in a network with three neurons, if
A0=(true,true,false),A1=(true,false,false), andA2=
(true,false,true), and there exist inputs, x0, x1, and x2 with
activation patternsA0,A1, andA2, then 〈A¯0, A¯1, A¯2〉 is a path.
Our proof relies on three facts, that we prove hereafter:
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1. There exists a path, P , from A¯x to A¯p where each region
in the path contains at least one input at distance less than
 from x, and either A¯x=A¯p or all A¯i,A¯j in the path are
different.
2. Our algorithm visits all regions in the path, P .
3. If a visited activation region contains an adversarial input,
our algorithm either detects it, returning not robust, or
returns unknown.
Together, (1), (2), and (3) imply that if an adversarial point, p,
exists, it resides in an activation region that would have been
checked by Algorithm 1, which would have resulted in the
algorithm returning not robust or unknown, contradicting the
assumption that it returned robust.
(1) Existence of a Path Consider the segment going from
x to p in a straight line. As ‖x− p‖ ≤ , all points on this
segment are also at distance less than . As f is a neural
network with ReLU activations, f is a continuous function, as
are the activation functions, fu for each of its internal neurons,
u. Furthermore, input points at the boundary between two
activation regions (i.e., z, such that fu(z)=0) belong to both
activation regions. Therefore, listing all activation regions on
the segment between x and p yields a path, P , from A¯x to A¯p,
with each region on the path containing an input point, xi, on
the segment, such that ‖x−xi‖≤.
That each A¯i, A¯j in P is unique follows from the convexity of
activation regions: If there exist A¯i=A¯j in P such that there
exists an A¯k in between, then A¯i = A¯j cannot be convex, as
there exists a line segment with its end points in A¯i and A¯j
that is not entirely contained within the region A¯i=A¯j. This
ensures that paths are of finite length.
(2) Exploration by the Algorithm Given the existence of
the path, P , from A¯x to A¯p, we now prove that Algorithm 1
would visit all activation regions in P if it returns robust. We
proceed by induction on the length of paths induced (similarly
to as above) by a line segment included in the -ball centered
on x.
In the base case, if the path is of length one, then it contains
only A¯x, and the claim holds trivially since Algorithm 1 starts
by visiting A¯x.
In the inductive case, let us assume that for any path with length
at most k induced by a segment, s, beginning at x with ‖s‖≤,
Algorithm 1 visits all regions in the path. Now consider a path,
P ′=A¯0,...,A¯k, of length k+1, induced by a segment, s′, begin-
ning at x with ‖s′‖≤. Since A¯k−1 is on the path, there exists
a point, xk−1, on s′ such that the sub-segment from x to xk−1
induces a path of length k; thus we can apply our induction hy-
pothesis to conclude that Algorithm 1 visits A¯0,...,A¯k−1. Now,
since A¯k−1 and A¯k are neighbors in P ′, they must share some
Algorithm 2 Certified Lower Bound on Local Robustness
Input: model F , data x, bound 
Initialize queue=priorityQ(), visited=∅, bound=0
. . .
while queue 6=∅ do
C = dequeue(queue)
bound = max(bound, d(x,C))
if is decision boundary(C) then
return bound
else
. . .
return 
boundary, C, that is intersected by s′. Thus, since ‖s′‖ ≤ ,
d(x,C)≤ ; thus when Algorithm 1 visits A¯k−1, it will add
A¯k to the queue via C. Therefore, since Algorithm 1 returns
robust only when all regions in the queue have been visited,
Algorithm 1 will visit A¯k, concluding the proof of (2).
(3) Detection of Adversarial Examples We conclude by
proving that if there exists an adversarial example in a region
visited by Algorithm 1, then we either return not robust or
unknown.
If p in A¯p is an adversarial example, then F(x) 6=F(p). By
continuity of f , this means that there exists an input, p′ on the
segment from x to p that is exactly on a decision boundary, C.
As ‖x−p′‖≤‖x−p‖≤ , C must have been analyzed when
exploring A¯p.
However, when analyzing a decision boundary, Algorithm 1
always returns either not robust or unknown.
Thus, the decision boundary in the activation region containing
p would have been analyzed by Algorithm 1; this yields a
contradiction, as the algorithm must have returned not robust
or unknown rather than robust.
2.3. Certified Lower Bounds
We now consider the related problem of finding a lower
bound on the local robustness of the network. A variant of
Algorithm 1, given by Algorithm 2, can provide certified lower
bounds by using a priority queue.
In this variant, constraints are enqueued with a priority corre-
sponding to their distance from x, such that the closest con-
straint to x is always at the front of the queue. We keep track of
the current certified lower bound in a variable, bound. At each
iteration, we set bound to the maximum of the old bound and
the distance from x to the constraint at the front of the queue.
The algorithm terminates either when all constraints at distance
less than the initially specified  were handled, or when a deci-
sion boundary for which the initial algorithm returns unknown
or not robust is found. In the first case, we return ; in the
second, we return the value stored in bound at this iteration.
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xbound d
d’
C
Figure 2. Illustration of a constraint, C, whose projection-based
distance, d, is smaller than the true distance, d′, from x to the feasible
portion ofC in the shaded activation region.
The proof of this variant is similar to the proof of Algorithm 1.
It relies on the following loop invariant.
Loop Invariant 1. (1) At each iteration, all activation regions
at distance less than bound from x were previously visited, (2)
bound is always smaller than , and (3) there is no adversarial
point at distance less than bound.
Proof. Loop Invariant 1 trivially holds on entry of the loop
since bound is initialized to 0. Proving that the invariant is
maintained is more interesting. Suppose that bound increases
to bound′. It must then be shown that there is no unvisited
activation region at distance less than bound′. We proceed
again by contradiction: assume there was such a region, A¯,
containing a point, p, such that ‖x−p‖≤bound′. Again, let us
consider the segment from x to p, and the path, P , it induces.
Let us consider A¯i, the first region of P at distance greater than
bound that was not previously visited. If no such region exists,
then A¯ is at distance less than bound from x, and so by our
induction hypothesis, it was already visited. otherwise, A¯i−1
was visited, and the activation constraint, C, between A¯i−1
and A¯i is such that d(x,C)≤bound′≤. Therefore, C (which
leads to A¯i) was already added to the queue with priority less
than bound′, and by virtue of the priority queue, it was explored
before the current iteration, which yields a contradiction.
If bound does not increase, the invariant still trivially holds.
This case can happen because our computation of the distance
to constraints is an underapproximation of the true distance
to the feasible portion of the constraint, as is illustrated in
Figure 2.
3. Efficient Implementation
In this section, we describe the key insights that allow us to im-
plement Algorithm 1 efficiently, and describe various optimiza-
tions we employ to improve its practicality. In Sections 3.1 and
3.2 we elaborate on the insights and implementation details rele-
vant to computing constraints and approximating their distance
from x. Section 3.3 describes heuristics for reducing the num-
ber of unknown results Algorithm 1 returns, and Section 3.4
presents optimizations we implement that speed up our analysis.
3.1. Computing Activation Region Boundaries
Recall our setting inwhichwe assume ourmodel,F , is given by
F(x)=argmax{f(x)}, where f is the function computed by
a neural network consisting of layers of linear transformations
with ReLU activations between layers. For a particular activa-
tion pattern, A, we observe that we can replace each ReLU,
in layer, i, with an element-wise multiplication by a vector, ai,
where the position in ai corresponding to neuron, u, takes value
1 ifA(u) is true, and 0 otherwise. Thus, when x∈A¯,
f(x)=
(((
xTW1+b1
)a1)W2+b2)a2...
which we observe is a linear function with the same slope
for all x in A¯. By the same argument, fu is a linear function,
wTux+bu, for all x in A¯.
Now consider the activation constraint, Cu, which is satisfied
when fu(x)≥0⇐⇒A(u). Given our above observation, we
see that this is a linear constraint with coefficients, wu, and
intercepts, bu. Note that the computation of these weights
and intercepts does not depend on a particular point in A¯
— only on the activation pattern, A. Thus, we can compute
the boundaries of an activation region, A¯, knowing only the
corresponding activation pattern,A.
In practice, the coefficients, wu, correspond to the gradient of
fu with respect to its inputs, evaluated at a point in A¯. However,
frameworks that perform automatic differentiation typically re-
quire a concrete point for evaluation of the gradient. Thus, we
compute the gradient via backpropagation with the activation
vectors, ai. The intercepts, bu, are computed via a forward com-
putation using the activation vectors, with x set to 0. These op-
erations can easily be implemented to run efficiently on a GPU.
Decision Boundaries For a sigmoid network, there is at
most a single decision boundary within any given activation
region, which can be computed via gradient backpropagation as
discussed above. In the case of a softmax model with multiple
classes, we have an output for each class. A decision boundary
for a point, x, given class, i, states that f(x)i≥f(x)j, for j 6=i.
Thus, for models with n classes, the decision boundary consists
of n−1 linear constraints derived from the difference of the
model’s output at the selected class and the model’s output at
each of the other classes.
3.2. Distances to Constraints
We observe that when working with the `2 norm, we can
efficiently compute projections using the dot product. Note
that this computation can be trivially performed in parallel on
many constraints at once by a GPU.
The distance from x to its projection onto a hyperplane
constraint, C, gives a lower bound on the distance from x to
the part of C that is feasible when the other constraints are
taken into consideration. This allows us to soundly determine
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if a boundary constraint is further than  from x, implying local
robustness, and is substantially faster than using constraint
solving to discover the true distance. In our evaluation, we find
that in high dimensions, the projected distance is an accurate
enough lower bound to make Algorithm 1 practical.
Finally, we note that the projection can be computed efficiently
for other norms as well, e.g., the `∞ norm (Section 4.4).
3.3. Improving the Completeness of the Algorithm
The vanilla version of our algorithm presented in Section 2
stops and possibly returns unknown at the first decision
boundary encountered. We now present two heuristics to
reduce the number of unknown results returned, at the price of
increased complexity. These heuristics are disabled by default
in our implementation. We leave it to the user to enable them
when deemed necessary.
Exploring the Full Queue If the analysis of a decision
boundary is inconclusive, Algorithm 1, as presented so far, stops
and returns unknown. We implement a variant of Algorithm 1
where we instead record the presence of an ambiguous decision
boundary but continue exploring other regions in the queue.
If we entirely empty the queue after unsuccessfully analyzing
a decision boundary, we nevertheless return unknown. How-
ever, oftentimes a true adversarial example is found during the
continued search, allowing us to return not robust conclusively.
The correctness of our algorithm still holds in this variant: an
inconclusive analysis of a decision boundary leads to either
returning unknown, or exhibiting a true adversarial example
found at a later stage.
Falling Back on LP Solving Existing complete tools (Katz
et al., 2017; 2019; Jordan et al., 2019; Tjeng & Tedrake, 2017;
Fischetti & Jo, 2018; Cheng et al., 2017) often rely heavily on
solvers to analyze models. When we cannot rule out adversarial
examples in a specific activation region, we can query an
LP solver, since both the activation constraints delimiting
a region and the decision boundaries inside this region are
linear constraints. This allows us to efficiently discharge many
verification conditions through fast geometric projections while
providing a complete, but slower, variant of our algorithm.
3.4. Speeding up the Analysis
In Section 2, Algorithm 1 is presented at a high level without
regard to performance. In this section, we give an overview
of the key optimizations we include in our implementation of
Algorithm 1 that are independent of the high-level behavior
of the algorithm.
Analyzing Decision Boundaries First The correctness of
Algorithm 1 is independent of how we iterate over the queue of
constraints to analyze. Since our algorithm terminates as soon
as we analyze a decision boundary, one useful optimization
is thus to ensure that such constraints are always handled
first. In our implementation of Algorithm 1, we use a queue
data-structure consisting of two standard FIFO queues: one for
decision boundaries and one for activation constraints. When
dequeuing an element, we always try to dequeue a decision
boundary first. This ensures that the most relevant constraints
are handled first without harming the asymptotic complexity
of our algorithm.
This optimization cannot be used when searching for a certified
lower bound without breaking the correctness of our algorithm.
It is thus only allowed when checking local robustness.
Batching Most deep learning software is designed to easily
enable efficient batch computations on a GPU. In particular,
the gradient backpropagations for computing constraints
(Section 3.1) and the dot product projections for calculating
distances (Section 3.2) lend themselves well to batching
on the GPU. We leverage this in our implementation of
Algorithm 1 by dequeuing multiple elements from the queue
at once and calculating the constraints and constraint distances
for the corresponding regions in parallel. We find that this
optimization enables a speedup of up to 2x on large examples
for a well-chosen batch size (∼10-100).
4. Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our implemen-
tation of Algorithms 1 and 2 on several models adversarially
trained (Madry et al., 2018) on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST.
We also include a subset of MNIST (binary MNIST) in which
the classification task is to distinguish between the digits “1”
and “7,” as models trained on this dataset were used in the
evaluation of GeoCert (Jordan et al., 2019). We selected 100
arbitrary instances from the test set of each dataset to perform
our evaluation on.
Each model in our evaluation is named with the following
convention: the name begins with an identifier for the dataset
it was trained on, either “mnist bin” (binary MNIST), “mnist”,
or “fmnist” (Fashion-MNIST), followed by the sizes of the
hidden layers. For example, the model, “fmnist40.40.40” was
trained on Fashion-MNIST and has three hidden layers with
40 neurons each.
All experiments were run on a 4.2GHz Intel Core i7-7700K
with 32 GB of RAM, and a Titan X GPU with 12 GB of
RAM. Our implementation is written in Python using the
Keras framework (Chollet et al., 2015) with the TensorFlow
backend (Abadi et al., 2015).
4.1. Local Robustness Certification
We first compare the efficiency of our implementation to that
of other tools certifying local robustness. GeoCert (Jordan
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Algorithm 1, `2, =0.25 GeoCert, `2, =0.25 MIP, `2, =0.25 Marabou, `∞, =0.25/
√
784
Model Time (s) R NR U TO Time (s) R NR TO Time (s) R NR TO Time (s) R NR TO
mnist bin10.50.10 0.020 100 0 0 0 0.675 99 0 1 sigmoid not supported 0.136 100 0 0
mnist bin20.20 0.015 99 0 1 0 0.463 99 0 1 sigmoid not supported 0.162 99 1 0
mnist20.20.20 0.029 87 6 6 1 4.839 72 2 26 47.97 69 11 20 1.875 95 5 0
mnist40.40.40 3.111 50 7 16 27 >60.0 13 12 75 >60.0 0 0 100 4.344 96 4 0
fmnist20.20.20 0.035 89 4 7 0 5.916 84 8 8 >60.0 0 0 100 3.669 93 7 0
fmnist40.40.40 1.528 65 3 9 23 >60.0 0 0 100 >60.0 0 0 100 5.147 97 3 0
Table 1. Comparison of local robustness certification on robustly trained binary MNIST, MNIST, and Fashion-MNIST models. Execution times
are the median over runs on 100 random test instances. For each of the 100 runs, results are either robust (R), not robust (NR), unknown (U),
or a timeout (TO).
Vanilla, `2, =0.25 Full queue, `2, =0.25
Model Time (s) R NR U TO Time (s) R NR U TO
mnist20.20.20 0.029 87 6 6 1 0.029 87 10 2 1
mnist40.40.40 3.111 50 7 16 27 6.166 50 14 6 30
fmnist20.20.20 0.035 89 4 7 0 0.036 89 9 2 0
fmnist40.40.40 1.528 65 3 9 23 2.910 65 7 1 27
Table 2. Comparison of Algorithm 1 and its variant with full exploration of the constraints queue (Section 3.3). The times reported are the median
over runs on 100 random test instances. For each of the 100 runs, results are either robust (R), not robust (NR), unknown (U), or a timeout (TO).
et al., 2019) and MIP (Tjeng & Tedrake, 2017) are the tools
most comparable to ours as they are able to exactly check for
robustness with an `2 norm. We also compare our implemen-
tation to the Marabou verification tool (Katz et al., 2019), an
improvement over Reluplex (Katz et al., 2017), that does not
handle the `2 norm, but instead supports the `∞ norm. While
these norms are not entirely commensurable, we perform the
comparison by checking the largest `∞ ball contained in the `2
ball of size . For MNIST models, this ball has size /
√
784 as
the input space is of dimension 784. Note that as a consequence,
we expect Marabou to label a higher fraction of the points as
robust, as the search space we give it is significantly smaller.
We evaluate each of these tools with  = 0.25. Specifically,
we compare the number of examples on which each tool
terminates, the result of the analyses that terminate, and the
median run time over the analyses of each of the selected 100
instances. We set a timeout of 20 seconds for the (smaller)
binary MNIST models and of 60 seconds for the (larger)
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST models. The results for these
experiments are presented in Table 1.
We observe that our implementation always outperforms
GeoCert by one to two orders of magnitude, without sacrificing
precision — we rarely return unknown when GeoCert
terminates. MIP does not support sigmoid activations and thus
cannot verify the smaller binary-MNIST networks. On the
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST networks we analyzed, MIP fre-
quently times out with a time budget of 60s, indicating that we
are faster by at least two orders of magnitude. This is consistent
with the 100 to 1000 seconds per solve on a MNIST model
with three hidden layers of 20 neurons each reported by Tjeng
et al. Their technique performs best on the `1 or `∞ norms.
While the comparison with Marabou’s `∞ verification is not
directly comparable, it is worth noting that we are 1.4x-100x
faster than Marabou despite the specified `∞ ball requiring
analysis of a much smaller input space.
Table 2 displays the results of experiments evaluating the impact
of exploring thewhole queue of constraints (Section 3.3) instead
of stopping at the first decision boundary as described in the
vanilla version of Algorithm 1. We compare the performance
of both variants on the larger networks for which the analysis of
the vanilla implementation was occasionally inconclusive. Ex-
perimental results show that this heuristic decreases the number
of unknown results while only having a minor impact on the
speed of the execution. Moreover, when enabling this heuristic,
we reduce the number of unknown results to the point that we
are able to recover the results obtained by GeoCert in almost ev-
ery instance for which GeoCert terminates, while nevertheless
performing our analysis one to two orders of magnitude faster.
4.2. Certified Lower Bounds
We now evaluate the variant of our algorithm computing
certified lower bounds on the minimum adversarial distortion
(Algorithm 2 in Section 2.3). To this end, we compare the
performance of our approach to the FastLin (Weng et al., 2018)
tool, which is designed to provide quick lower bounds on the
local robustness of ReLU networks.
FastLin is intended to scale to very large networks for which
exact checks like GeoCert and Marabou are computationally
infeasible. On these large networks (e.g., with thousands of neu-
rons), FastLin is substantially faster than our implementation;
however, the bounds it provides may be quite loose.
We compare the certified lower bound reported by our imple-
mentation of Algorithm 2 after 60 seconds of computation
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Model Algorithm 2, Mean Bound FastLin, Mean Bound Median Ratio
fmnist500.500.500.500 0.124 0.078 0.329
fmnist500.500.500.500.500 0.134 0.092 0.693
fmnist1000.1000.1000 0.083 0.021 0.035
Table 3. Comparison of Algorithm 2 with FastLin. Results reported are over runs on 100 random test instances. The mean bound reported
for Algorithm 2 is the lower bound returned after 60 seconds of computation. The ratio for a given instance is the bound obtained by FastLin
divided by the bound obtained by Algorithm 2.
to the lower bound reported by FastLin on 100 instances
arbitrarily picked from Fashion-MNIST; the results are
presented in Table 3. The mean lower bound is reported
for both methods, and we observe that on the models tested,
Algorithm 2 is able to find a better lower bound on average,
though it requires considerably more computation time.
Since the optimal bound may vary between instances, we also
report the median ratio of the lower bounds obtained by the
two methods on each individual instance. Here we see that
FastLin may indeed be quite loose, as on a typical instance it
achieves as low as 4% and only as high as 69% of the bound
obtained by Algorithm 2.
Finally, we note that, when Algorithm 2 terminates by finding
a decision boundary, if the projection onto that boundary
is a true adversarial example, the lower bound is tight. In
our experiments, there were few such examples — three on
fmnist500.500.500.500 and one on fmnist1000.1000.1000 —
however, in these cases, the lower bound obtained by FastLin
was very loose, achieving 4-15% of the optimal bound on
fmnist500.500.500.500, and only 0.8% of the optimal bound
on fmnist1000.1000.1000. This suggests that while FastLin
has been demonstrated to scale to large networks, one must
be careful with its application, as there may be cases in which
the bound it provides is too conservative.
4.3. Training for Verifiability
Adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018), used to train the
models in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, attempts to ensure that points
on the data manifold will be far from the model’s decision
boundary. Even if it achieves this objective, it may nonetheless
be difficult to verify because the performance of Algorithm 1
depends not only on the decision boundaries, but also on the
internal activation constraints. Thus, we expect certification
will be efficient only when the points to be certified are also far
from internal boundaries, leading to fewer regions to explore.
Recent work has sought to develop training procedures that
not only encourage robustness, but that also optimize for
efficient verification, e.g., (Wong & Kolter, 2018; Croce et al.,
2019). The approach used by Croce et al., maximum margin
regularization (MMR), is particularly suited to our work, as
it follows from the same intuition highlighted above.
Table 4 presents the results of running Algorithm 1 (with full
Algorithm 1, full queue, `2, =0.25
Model Time (s) R NR U TO
mnist20.20.20 0.063 83 10 7 0
mnist40.40.40 0.064 83 10 7 0
fmnist20.20.20 0.048 60 31 9 0
fmnist40.40.40 0.037 68 27 5 0
mnist1024 0.290 93 6 1 0
Table 4. Evaluation of local robustness certification using Algorithm 1
(with full queue exploration) on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST models
trained with MMR. Execution times are the median over runs on 100
random test instances. For each of the 100 runs, results are either
robust (R), not robust (NR), unknown (U), or a timeout (TO).
queue exploration) on models trained with MMR. We find
that on these models, Algorithm 1 performs significantly faster
on the 40.40.40 architectures, where it sees a speedup by two
orders of magnitude.
Moreover, the use of MMR allows Algorithm 1 to scale to far
larger networks than would be possible with adversarial training.
For example, on mnist1024 (the fully-connected model used
by Croce et al.), Algorithm 1 was able to successfully certify
all but one point with a median time of only 300ms.
In comparison, while GeoCert also experienced improved
performance on the MMR-trained models, our method
remained two orders of magnitude faster. MIP continued to
time out in nearly every case.
4.4. Generalization to Other Norms
The only aspect of Algorithms 1 and 2 that depends on the
norm is the projection and the projected distance computation,
making our approach highly modular with respect to the norm.
We evaluated an implementation of Algorithm 1 using the `∞
norm, and found that (1) the performance gain compared to
constraint-solving was less significant, and (2) the number of
unknown cases was higher compared with the `2 implemen-
tation. We suspect that the former is because constraint-solving
is more efficient in the `∞ space (as the objective function is
linear, and interval bound propagation is of greater use), and
that the latter suggests projection-based distances are a better
approximation in Euclidean space than in `∞ space.
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5. Related Work
As mentioned, our work can be grouped with approaches for
verifying neural network that aim to check local robustness
exactly (Katz et al., 2019; 2017; Jordan et al., 2019); the main
difference is that we aim to avoid expensive constraint solving
at the price of incompleteness.
GeoCert (Jordan et al., 2019) is the closest work to ours; it
aims to compute exact point-wise robustness of deep neural
networks for convex norms. Unlike our approach, GeoCert
computes the largest `p ball, centered at an input point, within
which the network is robust. Our experimental comparison
with GeoCert shows that our approach scales much better. This
is not surprising as GeoCert relies on projections to facets
(polytopes), which are solved by a quadratic program with
linear constraints. In contrast, our approach uses projection
to affine subspaces, which has a simpler, closed-form solution.
Reluplex (Katz et al., 2017) and its successor, Marabou (Katz
et al., 2019), use SMT solving techniques to check local
robustness and more general safety properties that can be
expressed as linear constraints. Our experiments show that our
approach performs better even in a setting that is advantageous
to Reluplex/Marabou.
ERAN (Singh et al., 2019a), and its predecessor, AI2 (Gehr
et al., 2018), rely on abstract interpretation (Cousot & Cousot,
1977) to automatically verify local robustness of neural
networks against both `∞ and geometric input perturbations.
As such, they use sound, conservative over-approximations to
perform their analysis, which leads to false positives, i.e. robust
inputs incorrectly classified as not robust. In comparison, all
of the inputs flagged as not robust by our approach have an
adversarial example at distance less than .
FastLin (Weng et al., 2018) explores the special structure
of ReLU networks to efficiently compute lower bounds on
adversarial minimal distortions. This was expanded to general
activation functions in a tool called CROWN (Zhang et al.,
2018). Although FastLin has been shown to be very scalable,
our experiments indicate that the computed bounds may be
quite imprecise.
Recently, another quite different approach has been proposed
for robustness certification. Randomized Smoothing (Cohen
et al., 2019; Lecuyer et al., 2018) is a post-processing technique
that provides a stochastic robustness guarantee at inference time.
This approach differs from our approach in that it (1)modifies
the predictions of the original model (increasing the complexity
of making predictions), and (2) provides a probabilistic robust-
ness guarantee that is quantified via a confidence bound. As
such it provides an alternative set of costs and benefits as com-
pared to our approach. Its complexity also differs from that of
our approach, as it is dependent less on the architecture of the
model, but rather on the number of samples required to perform
its post-processing of the model’s output. We find that in our ex-
perimental setup, achieving the same probabilistic guarantee as
the experiments described in (Cohen et al., 2019) (requiring 105
samples), Randomized Smoothing takes approximately 4.5 sec-
onds per instance to make a certified prediction on each of the
models tested in Section 4.1. Thus, for these models, our imple-
mentation is on average faster or comparable in performance.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented a new approach to verify the
local robustness of networks with piecewise linear activation
functions. Compared to previous work, our approach does
not rely on constraint solving nor over-approximations but
rather on geometric projections. While most existing tools
focus on linear constraints, and therefore on `1 and `∞ norms,
we provide an efficient, highly parallel implementation to
certify `2-robustness. Our implementation outperforms existing
exact tools by up to two orders of magnitude on MNIST
and Fashion-MNIST, while empirically maintaining the same
precision under a time constraint.
Several possible improvements to our implementation are left
as future work. The algorithm presented in Section 2 is norm-
independent, but its performance relies on efficiently comput-
ing projections using a GPU. We implemented this for the
`2 and `∞ norms; extending our approach to other norms
would require similar techniques, which already exist for the `1
norm (Condat, 2015; Duchi et al., 2008) for instance. As our im-
plementation runs mostly on a GPU, we should also be able to
more aggressively fall back on parallel executions of LP solvers,
which run on CPUs, when our analysis is inconclusive. Finally,
we plan to add support for convolutional neural networks.
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